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PRESERVATION OF INDIANA'S SCENIC AREAS: A METHOD
The urbanization of Indiana proceeds at a rapid pace,1 and as its
cities grow, the preservation of the state's scenic areas becomes an
increasingly acute problem.' Historically, states and their subdivisions,
working separately or in conjunction, have endeavored to preserve scenic
areas by employing the zoning power or by condemning the fee under the
power of eminent domain. However, in most jurisdictions zoning
ordinances predicated solely upon aesthetic considerations have been in-
validated.8 This has been the case in Indiana,4 and consequently, the
zoning power cannot be employed effectively to preserve scenic areas.
Theoretically a state could use its power of eminent domain to pre-
serve scenic areas. On a practical level, however, there are numerous
reasons which prohibit this type of solution. The most basic reason, of
course, would be the prohibitively high cost of acquiring the fee or any
lesser interest. In connection with this, local authorities who wish to
condemn land to preserve scenic areas and who lack financial resources
are seldom able to secure economic assistance from state officials.' Thus,
in most instances, they abandon their plans since they are reluctant to
create a bonded debt.
In addition to the cost factor, there are other reasons why the eminent
domain power is not suited to the task of preserving scenic areas. For
1. According to the 1940 census, 55.1% of Indiana's population lived in urban areas.
By 1960 this percentage had increased to 62.4%. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMRCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (83d ed. 1962). There is no reason to believe this
trend will reverse itself.
2. Preservation of scenic areas has become a widespread problem. See generally
CLAWSON, HELD & STODDARD, LAND FOR THE FUTURE (1960) ; SEIGEL, THE LAW OF OPEN
SPACE (1960).
3. For general discussions of aesthetic zoning, see Anderson, Reguelationt of Land
Use For Aesthetic Purposes, 15 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 33 (1963) ; Dunkeminier, Zoning for
Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 218 (1955); Rodda,
The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 So. CALIF. L.
REv. 149 (1953); Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote the
Public Welfare?, 35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949); Note, 29 FORDHAm L. REv. 729 (1961), and
cases cited therein.
4. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309
(1930). In this case, the Indiana Supreme Court, in holding that an ordinance prohibit-
ing billboards within 500 feet of a park or boulevard was valid but unenforceable as to
existing billboards except on payment of compensation, stated, ". . . citizens must not
be compelled under the police power to give up rights in property solely for the attain-
ment of aesthetic objectives."
5. E.g., in 1960 less than 2% of all funds spent by local governmental units for
parks and other scenic areas came from the states. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GovmN-
MENTS, STAT RESPONSIBILITY IN URBAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 155 (1962).
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example, intelligent planning to preserve such areas might well require
the state to condemn large tracts many years before they are actually
threatened by urbanization. Such a requirement would present a formid-
able .problem in those jurisdictions which have held that the state may
not exercise its eminent domain power to condemn land in advance of its
immediate needs.' Other jurisdictions, however, have upheld advance
acquisition of land when, for example, it was to be used for a future
airport or a public street.' Even in these jurisdictions, however, it could
be argued that the courts would not extend their present positions on
advance acquisition to permit acquisition of scenic areas on the mere
contingency that someday they might be engulfed by the growth of nearby
urban complexes.
Another factor tending to make eminent domain an unsuitable device
for preserving scenic areas is that elected officials might oppose large
scale acquisition of such areas on the assumption that a politically rational
allocation of state funds would dictate giving greater aid to schools and
other public projects instead of providing beautiful views for those who
travel along state highways. Finally, many "conservatives" would surely
oppose large scale governmental ownership of land for any purpose.
Because of the inadequacy of the traditional methods of preserving
scenic areas, new and, in most instances, untested methods have come into
existence. These methods include tax relief plans, state acquisition of
development rights, compensable regulation under state law, and private
programs designed to encourage landowners to limit voluntarily their
property to residential uses.' This note deals with one type of private
approach, but before examining it in depth the other methods previously
mentioned will be discussed briefly and their shortcomings noted.
I. PRESERVATION BASED ON PUBLIC POWER
A. Tax Relief Plans
High property taxes often force development of those scenic areas
which are adaptable to subdivision. In order to provide landowners with
incentives not to sell their land to developers it has been advocated that
6. Grand Rapids Bd. of Educ. v. Baczewsld, 340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W2d 810 (1954);
State ex. rel City of Duluth v. Duluth St. Ry., 179 Minn. 548, 229 N.W. 883 (1930).
7. Carlor Co. v. City of Miami, 62 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
821 (1954) (airport); City of New Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675
(1930) (public street). See Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Space, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 1622, 1635 (1962).
S. Methods of preserving scenic areas by the use of greenbelt zoning, cluster zoning,
contract zoning, conditions subsequent, and rights of reverter are not discussed in this
note.
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preferential tax treatment be extended to such landowners.'
Any statute providing for assessment of property taxes based on the
restricted use to which the land would be put would generate serious
constitutional problems. Attempts to classify real property taxes by
relationship to land use have been declared invalid in many jurisdictions.Y
In view of the Indiana Supreme Court's strict, literal interpretation of the
uniform tax clause in the state constitution it seems likely that a reduction
of property taxes commensurate with the limited use to which land might
be put (under a land preservation program) would be declared uncon-
stitutional."
In addition to the constitutional objection to property tax concessions
as a method of preserving scenic areas, it has been suggested that the
process of granting exemptions feeds upon itself." This conclusion is
based on the thought that as more and more exemptions are granted, the
tax burden becomes greater upon the persons left to bear it with the
result that, in many instances, undeniable demands for even more exemp-
tions are pressed upon the legislature. In view of the working of our
political processes this self-propagation of exemptions appears to be a
valid criticism.
Even if a tax relief plan did not destroy itself or succumb to con-
stitutional attack, it would seem that in scenic areas where expansion
9. RAwsoN, PROPERTY TAXATION AND URBAN EFFECrs OF THE PROPERTY TAX ON
CITY GROWTH AND C3HANGE (Urban Land Institute Research Monograph No. 4, 1961) ;
Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property Taxation--Some Suggestionms, 1964 Wis.
L. REv. 628.
10. Swiftz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 556, 182 A.2d 841 (1962). Cf. Bettigale v. Assess-
ors of Springfield, 342 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961) ; State ex. rel. Park Investment
Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195 N.E.2d 908, 910 (Ohio 1964)
("[T]here is no constitutional authorization for classification of real property for taxa-
tion in relation to its nature or use. All property . . .must be assessed on the basis of
the same uniform percentage of actual value").
11. Ind. Const. art. X § 1:
The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation; and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a
just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting
such only for municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable
purposes, as may be specially exempted by law.
It has been interpreted strictly and literally. Finney v. Johnson, 342 Ind. 465, 179 N.E.2d
718 (1962) ; Wright v. Steers, 242 Ind. 583, 179 N.E.2d 721 (1962). Indiana presently
has several property tax statutes favoring agricultural and forested land which seem
vulnerable to constitutional attack. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 65-128 (Burn's 1961)
(annexation statute granting tax favoritism to rural areas); IND. ANN. STAT. § 32-3019
(Burn's 1949) (land to be taxed at one dollar per acre for general taxation purposes if
owner plants upon it trees of certain size and number) ; Ind. Acts 1963, ch. 323 (land to
be taxed as agricultural land despite non-agricultural potential as long as agricultural
use lasts). For an excellent discussion of uniform property taxation in Indiana, see
Note, Uniform Property Taxation in Indiana: The Need For a Constitutional Amend-
meit, 38 IND. L.J. 72 (1962).
12. Walker, Loopholes In State And Local Taxes, 30 TAX POLIcY 4 (1963).
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of neighboring cities was imminent landowners would fall prey to the
temptation to realize greater prospective income by adapting their land
to other than residential uses even though an advantageous tax position
would be sacrificed. Because of these reasons, preferential tax treatment
by itself promises little success as a method for comprehensive preserva-
tion of scenic areas.
B. Development Rights"'
Several legislatures have enacted statutes authorizing the state to
acquire development rights in land.'" After development rights (which
are statutory interests in real property) are surrendered the owner may
continue to use and enjoy the land, but it is subject to the right of the
state to keep it undeveloped. This restriction runs with the land and binds
all subsequent purchasers. No decision has yet recognized the validity of
bare development rights as enforceable interests in land although there is
no apparent reason why their validity should be denied.
Like the other novel methods of preserving scenic areas, the use of
development rights can be criticized in several respects. One authority 5
on land use control has attacked the enabling acts which provide for state
acquisition of development rights by pointing out that these acts do not
clearly spell out, as they should, what interests the landowner forfeits
under a development right scheme. This seems to be a just criticism since
courts would surely declare themselves incapable of enforcing use restric-
tions of an indefinite nature. 6
Even if the extent of the interest surrendered by the landowner is
amply defined, other objections remain to the use of development rights.
Where development is imminent, for example, it seems clear that a govern-
mental body acquiring development rights might have to pay almost the
full value of the land. In addition, it has been observed 7 that courts
would be reluctant to issue injunctions prior to a breach of the restrictions
and that damages are not only difficult to ascertain but are insufficient
13. Development rights have also been referred to as conservation easements,
scenic easements, and development easements.
14. CAL. GoVT CODE §§ 6950-54, 7000; MD. CODE ANNx. art. 66(c), § 357(a) (Supp.
1964) ; MASS. GEN. Lws ch. 40, § 8(c) (1961) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8A-1 (1961);
N.Y. CONSERVATION LAW §§ 1-0701, 1-0708. See generally WILLIAMS, LAND AcQUISI-
TION FOR OUTDOOR REcREATION-ANALYSiS OF SELECTED PROBLEMS (O.R.R.R.C. Study
Report 16) (1962), for a cursory study of the legal problems generated by these statutes.
15. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 48.
16. Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Cleveland Metropolitan Park
Dist., 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922). See Kransnowiecki & Paul, The Preser-
vation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 194 n. 57 (1961),
and cases cited therein.
17. Eveleth, An Appraisal of Techniques To Preserve Open Space, 9 VILL. L. REV.
559, 567 (1964).
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relief as, for example, where trees are cut. Moreover, if it later turns
out that the state believes that the property subject to the development
rights should be used more intensively no appreciable market for the sale
of the rights would exist.18 As a result the state would likely recover only
a small part of its original investment.
Perhaps the most authoritative commentary on the efficacy of the
development right approach has been offered by the National Park
Service, which has acquired some 7,500 acres in development rights along
federal highways in several southern states. The service recently dis-
continued the acquisition of such rights because after twenty years of
experience it found the rights bred misunderstanding, caused administra-
tive difficulties, were difficult to enforce, and cost only a little less than
the fee.'
C. Compensable Regulation
Compensable regulation as a scheme for preserving scenic areas was
devised by Professors Krasnowiecki and Paul in a study sponsored by
Penjerdel, Inc., a regional planning association for Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Delaware.20 They advocate placing on development govern-
mental controls similar to zoning restrictions but coupled with a guarantee
that the owner will receive, at the time of the sale of his land, an amount
equal to the market value of the property determined at a time prior to the
imposition of the controls. The owner is paid nothing to compensate for
the restrictions until he sells his property and then only an amount equal
to the difference between the sale price and the earlier assessed value.2
This scheme is vulnerable to attack from several directions. It is
certainly more complex than tax preference plans or acquisition of
development rights and therefore would require more administrative
machinery, thus heightening the cost of the program. In fact, it would
seem difficult to predict the cost of the program with any degree of
accuracy. In addition, there are inherent in the plan enforcement problems
which are similar to those discussed with regard to development rights.
Finally, many citizens would oppose on philosophical and economic
grounds a mandatory surrender of the landowner's right to the speculative
worth of his property.
18. In most instances, the entire market would consist of the owner of the fee.
19. H.R. REP. No. 273, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
20. For the definitive study of compensable regulation and a tentative draft "act"
designed to implement it, see Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 16.
21. The sale price is determined at a review board supervised public auction where
the necessary adjustments are made for inflation.
NOTES
II. PRESERVATION BASED ON PRIVATE INITIATIVE
At a time when New York is willing to spend 100 million dollars,
Pennsylvania 70 million dollars, New Jersey 60 million dollars, and
Wisconsin 50 million dollars to preserve areas of scenic beauty, it seems
incomprehensible that state governments have, for the most part, neglected
the possibility of acquiring scenic rights in land through voluntary re-
strictive agreements.22 This neglect is not justifiable in view of the
tremendous savings which would accrue to a state from the successful
implementation of such a program.
This note will examine and evaluate the potential efficacy of one
type of voluntary program designed to preserve areas of scenic beauty.
This program revolves around the concept of what has been dubbed "do-
it-yourself-zoning" and, to date, has been adopted in one jurisdiction-
New York.23
The scope of the New York program is presently limited to that
area in the Adirondack Mountains within approximately one mile of the
high water mark of Lake George.24 In this area, a commission created to
administer the program has the power to:
. . . sponsor, and encourage the use of forms of deeds, agree-
ments, covenants, and other legal documents by means of which
owners of real property within Lake George park may volun-
tarily prohibit, restrict, or control the use thereof for commercial
purposes."
All deeds, agreements, covenants, and other legal documents which the
commission sponsors and which owners of real property in Lake George
Park sign are executed in favor of the commission.27 After two or more
adjacent landowners have uniformly restricted their land in its favor,
the commission may permanently zone the restricted area in conformance
with the development restriction imposed by the landowners upon them-
22. N.Y. CONSERVATION LAW § 875; Pa. J. Res. 5, S.B. 45 (1963), approved by
voters, Nov. 4, 1963; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8A-2 (1961) ; Wis. STAT. § 23.09 (1957).
Perhaps this neglect reflects pessimism on the part of state officials who believe that
private citizens would not voluntarily surrender potentially valuable rights in land. In
this regard it is interesting to note that approximately 30% of the total land acquired by
the states of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut for parks between 1942 and 1956
was obtained through gifts. The Race for Open Space, 96 R.P.A. Buu.. 53 (1960).
23. Eveleth, supra note 17, at 576.
24. N.Y. CONSERvATION LAW § 841(1).
25. Id. § 842.
26. Id. § 843 (2).
27. Id. § 843(4). Section 843(5) empowers the commission to establish regulations
by which it may authorize a necessary use of land in an individual instance by modifying
in whole or in part any restriction contained in any agreement to which it is a party.
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selves.2" The commission possesses no power to zone an area unless all
landowners within the area voluntarily restrict their land in favor of the
commission.29 One who refuses to impose restrictions upon his land
cannot be bound by this "do-it-yourself-zoning." '0
"Do-it-yourself-zoning," like the other new methods of preserving
scenic areas, is not without defects. In fact, it could be argued that the
plan generates as many problems as it was designed to remedy. 1 Foremost
among these problems is the validity of the purported restrictions imposed
by the landowner upon his estate.32 What enforceable interest is vested
in the state by the landowner when he acts under the statute to restrict
the use of his land? Does the state secure a real covenant running with
the land, an easement, a restrictive covenant, or no interest at all?
The statute clearly does not create a real covenant running with the
land. Real covenants running with the land require "privity of estate."33
28. Id. § 843(10). The commission is also empowered to alter or extend a perma-
nent zone under the procedure applicable to the original establishment of the zone. Id.
§ 843(11).
29. At last report three permanent resident zones and six proposed zones have been
established. Preliminary work is under way to create eight additional zones. Eveleth,
supra note 17, at 577, citing The Schenectady Gazette, August 30, 1964.
30. Cf. Eveleth v. Best, 322 Mich. 637, 34 N.W.2d 504 (1948), where neither
plaintiffs nor any of their predecessors in their chain of title signed an agreement under
which other lot owners in an unrestricted subdivision attempted to impose restrictions
upon all the lots in the subdivision. The court held the restrictions were not applicable
to the plaintiffs' lots.
31. Several problems are raised by "do-it-yourself-zoning" under the Lake George
Park scheme which are not treated in this note. For instance, if the commission "secures
interests or rights in real property" under N.Y. CONSERVATION LAW § 843(4) and if
these rights are enforceable, as presumably they would be, why is it necessary that the
commission establish a "permanent zone," § 843(10), in order to control the uses to
which the restricted land is to be put? Can the restrictions, if they are enforceable, be
enforced at law (it seems clear they could be enforced in equity by injunction) ? How
can the commission prove it has suffered monetary damages? Must the restrictions
provide for liquidated damages in case of a breach before the commission has a remedy
at law? Must authority appear in the statute giving the commission power to insert a
provision for liquidated damages before it can be inserted in the agreements?
Does the power given 'by implication to the landowners in Lake George Park to
make restrictions which become regulations governing the use of land which are en-
forceable at the instance of the commission constitute an unconstitutional attempt to
delegate legislative power? Does the "power," as distinguished from the duty, to en-
force the restrictions or the "power," as distinguished from the duty, to modify or
waive a restriction, § 843(5), constitute unreasonable spot zoning? Does the power
given to the commission to alter or modify in whole or in part any restriction contained
in any agreement with the commission prevent the landowners from enforcing the re-
strictions inter se?
32. No case has yet arisen to test the validity of the restrictions.
33. One noted authority, CLARK, COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS RuNNING
WITH THE LAND 116-37 (2d ed. 1947), after making an exhaustive study of early
English decisions reached the conclusion that privity between the covenantor and the
covenantee was not necessary to satisfy the privity of estate requirement. Notwith-
standing the weakness of the historical support for the privity requirement most states
still adhere to it.
408
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To satisfy the privity of estate requirement, most courts, including those
in Indiana, hold there must be a conveyance of an interest in land by the
covenantee to the covenantor (or vice versa) when the covenant is made."4
This requirement would not be satisfied by the agreements between the
state and the landowners under a "do-it-yourself-zoning" plan.
Some authorities have argued that agreements which limit land to
residential uses have the characteristics of easements in gross,"' but this
argument is not supported by either the relevant case law or statutes.
An easement in gross is not appurtenant to any estate in land and does
not belong to any person by virtue of his ownership of an estate in land. 8
On the contrary, an easement in gross is the right possessed by a person
to perform affirmative acts upon the land of another or in any other
lawful manner use that land in accordance with the terms of the easement
grant." Typical examples of an easement in gross are the rights to enter
upon the land of another to camp, pipe water, erect and maintain telegraph
poles, or erect signboards or to cross the land when it is not appurtenant
to a dominant tenement.3" Agreements executed under a New York type
statute would impose negative duties upon the landowners39 and would
give the state no affirmative rights of the character enjoyed by those
who hold an easement in gross. Thus, the agreements would not create
easements in gross because negative easements in gross have no ex-
34. Cummings v. Alexander, 233 Ala. 10, 169 So. 310 (1936) ; Heimburge v. State
Guar. Corp., 116 Cal. App. 380, 2 P.2d 998 (1931) ; Henderson Lumber Co. v. Waycross
& W. Ry., 148 Ga. 69, 96 S.E. 263 (1918) ; Indianapolis Water Co. v. Nulte, 126 Ind.
373, 26 N.E. 72 (1890) ; Wells v. Benton, 108 Ind. 585, 8 N.E. 444 (1886), rehearing
denied, 108 Ind. 585, 9 N.E. 601 (1886); Conduit v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166, 26 N.E. 198
(1886) ; Hazlitt v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 (1881) ; Swiss Oil Corp. v. Dials, 232 Ky. 298,
22 S.W.2d 912 (1929); Lawrence v. Whitney, 115 N.Y. 410, 22 N.E. 174 (1889);
Harsha v. Reid, 45 N.Y. 415 (1871) ; Ford v. Oregon Elec. Ry. Co., 60 Ore. 278, 117
Pac. 809 (1911) ; Lingle Water Users' Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo.
41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931); Gavit, Covenants Running with the Land, 5 IND. LJ. 432
(1930).
35. E.g., WLLIAaIS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 37.
36. Antonopulas v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 261 App. Div. 564, 26 N.Y.S.2d 403
(1941), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 712, 39 N.E.2d 931 (1942) ; Banach v. Home Gas Co., 23 Misc.
2d 556, 199 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ; Weigold v. Bates, 144 Misc. 395, 258 N.Y.
Supp. 695 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
37. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792 (1937);
Forest Land Co. v. Black, 216 S.C. 255, 57 S.E.2d 420 (1950).
38. See, e.g., Morgan v. McLoughlin, 6 Misc. 2d 434, 163 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct.
1957), aff'd sub nion., Morgan v. Glen Cove, 6 App. Div. 2d 704, 174 N.Y.S.2d 890
(1958), aff'd nzer. 5 N.Y.2d 1041, 158 N.E.2d 498 (1959) (to camp); Gould v. Wilson,
115 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (to pipe water); Antonopulas v. Postal Tel. Cable
Co., 261 App. Div. 564, 26 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1941), aff'd 287 N.Y. 712, 39 N.E.2d 931
(1942) (to erect and maintain telegraph poles); Borrough Bill Posting Co. v. Levy,
144 App. Div. 784, 129 N.Y. Supp. 740 (1911) (to erect signboards) ; Sanxay v. Hunger,
42 Ind. 44 (1873) (to cross land).
39. They are under a duty to refrain from using their land for other than resi-
dential purposes.
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istence-a negative easement must always be an appurtenant easement.40
A third classification in which the state's interest might be placed
is the negative appurtenant easement. The chief characteristic of the
negative appurtenant easement is the existence of a dominant tenement.4"
This type of easement is created for the express purpose of benefiting
the possessor of the dominant tenement in his use of the tenement.42
Therefore, if the interests held by the state are to be classified as negative
appurtenant easements, they must be supported by a dominant tenement.
There are various arguments which a state might advance to demon-
strate that a dominant tenement exists under a "do-it-yourself-zoning"
scheme." One authority suggests that it could be argued that agreements
which limit land to residential use could be regarded as appurtenant to all
land in the neighborhood because they increase the value of all such land."
However, this argument is supported by neither statutory nor judicial
authority. Moreover, if the restrictions were regarded as appurtenant to
all land in the neighborhood it would seem that the landowners could en-
force the restrictions inter se and thus frustrate the state's power to permit
modifications of individual restrictions when it sees fit."
William H. Whyte, an authority on the problems of preserving
areas of scenic beauty, has argued that a state commission which acquires
use restrictions could serve as the dominant tenement."' However, the case
law of easements reveals no instances when anything other than realty
40. 2 AmERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 8.12 (Casner ed. 1952).
41. Uihlein v. Matthew, 172 N.Y. 154, 64 N.E. 792 (1902) ; Pierce v. Keator, 70
N.Y. 419 (1877).
42. Antonopulas v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 261 App. Div. 564, 26 N.Y.S.2d 403
(1941), aff'd, 287 N.Y. 712, 39 N.E.2d 931 (1942) ; Wilson v. Ford, 209 N.Y. 186, 102
N.F_ 612 (1913) ; Weigold v. Bates, 144 Misc. 395, 258 N.Y. Supp. 695 (Sup. Ct. 1932);
3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 392 (1952).
43. In the case of the Lake George Park scheme, the state might contend that Lake
George is the dominant tenement. The case law of easements reveals no instances in
which a lake was held to be either a dominant or servient tenement; and state legis-
latures have remained silent on this issue. In theory there appears to be no valid reason
why New York courts could not hold that the lake is the dominant tenement since the
absence of commercial activities as a result of the landowners' compliance with the use re-
strictions benefits the state as the constructive possessor of Lake George. Of course, it
should be remembered that even if the above theory was widely accepted a state-owned
lake will not, in most instances, be present to furnish the state with a dominant tenement
if it elects, when attempting to enforce the restrictions, to consider them negative ease-
ments.
44. WmLiAms, op. cit. supra note 14, at 50.
45. See note 27 supra.
46. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CoxsmEvATIoN EASE-
MENTS (Urban Land Institute, Technical Bull. No. 36, 1959). Cf. Note, 36 HARv. L. REv.
107 (1922), which discusses a business as a dominant tenement of an equitable servitude
and cites Palumbo v. Piccioni, 89 N.J. Eq. 40, 103 AtI. 815 (1918), and Francisco v.
Smith, 143 N.Y. 488, 38 N.E. 980 (1894).
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was held to be a dominant tenement." In view of this there seems no
likelihood that the courts would recognize a corporate body as such.
Thus it appears that the only way in which a state could reasonably
be certain of convincing a court that a dominant tenement exists would be
to purchase land near but not necessarily contiguous to the restricted
area.4" To require the state to go to such lengths would do much to destroy
the principal advantage-nominal cost-of a voluntary program to pre-
serve scenic areas.
Even if a state could prove that it owned land which was benefited
because of an agreement between itself and another by which the other
imposed restrictions upon the use of his land this would not, in itself, mean
that the state held a negative easement. In order for a state to prove it
holds a negative easement it must demonstrate that the benefits which
it enjoys as possessor fall within the class of benefits which traditionally
flow to the dominant tenement as a result of the creation of such an
easement.
The scope of negative easements has not been extended beyond the
four types recognized by the early English cases: easements for support
of a building, either laterally or subjacently, easements for the flow of an
artificial stream, and easements for light and air.49 Unless the benefits
which the state secures as an owner of land fall within one of these four
types of benefits, it cannot enforce the interests which it holds as negative
easements even though other benefits might flow to it because of the
restrictions.
Since the assumed dominant tenement would not be contiguous to the
restricted land in most instances but on the contrary would be situated
many miles from it, there is no hope of justifying the restrictions as
negative easements for the lateral or subjacent support of buildings located
on state land. The contention that the state secured a negative easement
which would entitle it to the continued flow of an artificial stream also
may be promptly dismissed. It would be ludicrous for the state to argue
47. One authority, Eveleth, supra note 17, at 569, has come to Whyte's defense by
characterizing as "casual" NWhyte's reference to a corporate body serving as a dominant
tenement.
48. Although there must be a sufficient nexus between the dominant and servient
tenement, the law of easements does not require that these tenements be contiguous.
See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 1224 (3d ed. 1939), and cases cited therein. Although
each case supporting this proposition has involved a traditional affirmative easement,
there is no valid reason why the scope of the proposition can not be extended to include
negative easements as long as the possessor of the so-called dominant tenement does, in
fact, derive a benefit from his use of the tenement due to the negative duties which the
other landowner imposes upon himself.
49. 2 AMERIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.24 (Casner ed. 1952); GALE, EASEMENTS
21-22 (13th ed. Bowles 1959); Reno, Equitable Sernitudes, 28 VA. L. REv. 951, 976(1942). Judicial conservatism has prevented expansion of the easement concept.
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that because landowners, in a document couched in general language,
restrict the use of their land to residential purposes the state thereby
acquires a negative easement for the flow of any artificial stream which
might pass from their land over intervening land to state-owned realty.
The courts would surely reject this construction; but even if the state
prevailed in its interpretation, few, if any, artificial streams which would
flow over state land would also flow from the restricted areas. Thus the
state still would have established no basis upon which to enforce the
restrictions against the great majority of individuals who restricted their
land. Likewise, the contention that the restrictions are negative easements
for light and air must fail. With the possible exception of state land
immediately adjacent to the restricted area, it would be foolish for the
state to contend that land it owns miles distant is benefited by the restric-
tions and that this benefit takes the form of a negative easement for light
and air."0
If the state fails to demonstrate that the interests which it holds and
which inure to the benefit of its realty are traditional negative easements,
the law will not permit it to justify the restrictions as negative easements
of a novel kind.5 One court has remarked:
The law does not permit the owner of real estate to contract
in matters affecting title as he sees fit. He cannot create new
kinds of easements . . . which are not authorized or recognized
at law. 2
Thus it appears that the interests held by a state under a plan similar
to the New York scheme could not be justified as easements in gross or
as negative appurtenant easements. 3
50. The voluminous case law in this area upholding negative easements of light
and air involves situations in which the benefited and burdened tenements were in
proximity. This is not unexpected in view of the fact there would be no need to secure
such an easement from one distantly situated.
51. Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 535, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834); 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.12 (Casner ed. 1952); GALE, op. cit. supra note 49;
GODDARD, EASEMENTS 111-12 (5th ed. 1921) ; Reno, supra note 49.
52. Rubel Bros. v. Dumont Ice & Coal Co., 111 Misc. 658, 182 N.Y. Supp. 204, 210
(Sup. Ct. 1920), rev'd on other grounds, 200 App. Div. 135, 192 N.Y. Supp. 705 (1922).
One writer has persuasively argued that easements of a novel type can be created and
will be enforced by the courts. It is significant to note, however, that his illustrations
do not consist of new types of negative easements but rather involve new types of af-
firmative easements. Conrad, Easement Novelties, 30 CALIF. L. REv. 125 (1942).
53. If the state could refute the arguments that the interests held by the state
agency are not appurtenant easements, other difficulties nevertheless persist. For
example, the legislature might decide to transfer the agency's right to enforce the re-
strictions to another state agency. This might result in the extinguishment of the
easement since an easement which is created as an appurtenant easement can not ordin-
arily be detached for the purpose of succession from the dominant tenement. Cadwalader
v. Bailey, 71 R.I. 495, 23 Atl. 20 (1891) ; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.73 (Casner
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The soundest approach under the common law appears to be to justify
the state's interest as a restrictive covenant. 4 Restrictions on the use of
land, like the state's interest, not falling within the scope of negative
easements" can be classified as restrictive covenants."0 Since it is im-
probable that under a "do-it-yourself zoning" plan a state will own land
in the restricted area, 7 its interest would be a restrictive covenant in
gross; and it should initially determine if the courts will enforce such
covenants before it decides so to classify its interests."8
In London County Council v. Allen, 9 the leading case denying the
enforcement of restrictive covenants in gross, a landowner applied to the
plaintiffs, the London County Council, for their approval of his laying
out of a new street on his land. The plaintiffs gave their approval on
condition that the owner covenant not to build on the plot of land which
lay across the end of the proposed street to provide facilities for the con-
tinuation of the street. The owner accordingly executed a deed in which
he covenanted with plaintiffs that he, his heirs, and his assigns would
not erect any structure upon the plot in question before securing the
plaintiffs' consent. The plaintiffs did not possess any neighboring land
ed. 1952). In view of these various difficulties, one authority has concluded that refusal
by the courts to enforce restrictions having purely aesthetic value has destroyed the
utility of easements as devices to impose the types of restrictions most needed to pre-
serve areas of beauty. Fratcher, Legal Servitudes As Devices For Imposing Use Re-
strictions in Michigan, 2 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 98 (1955).
54. Authorities have also referred to restrictive covenants as negative easements,
Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877), equitable negative easements, Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y v. Brennan, 148 N.Y. 661, 43 N.E. 173 (1896), equitable servitudes.
CLARK, op. cit. snpra note 33, at 175, and equitable easements, Pound, Progress of The
Law, 33 HARv. L. REv. 813 (1919).
55. One writer has stated that the failure of the courts to extend the scope of
negative easements to new and novel situations was probably the basis for the develop-
ment of the doctrine of land restrictions now enforced as restrictive covenants. Reno,
supra note 49, at 959.
56. If a state implementing a "do-it-yourself-zoning" program elects to consider
the interests it holds as restrictive covenants they must be supported by consideration.
Hendrick v. Wisehart, 57 Ind. 129 (1877) ; Elliot v. Kelley, 121 Ind. App. 529, 98 N.E.2d
374 (1951) ; Nichols v. Hays, 20 Ind. App. 369, 50 N.E. 768 (1898). This requirement
will not, however, significantly increase the minimal cost of the program because the
slightest consideration given by the state-for example, one dollar-would be sufficient
to support the covenants executed by the landowners. First Nat'l Bank v. Farmer's
Bank, 171 Ind. 323, 86 N.E. 417 (1908) ; Price v. Jones, 105 Ind. 543, 5 N.E. 683 (1886) ;
Knarr v. Sand Creek Turnpike, 45 Ind. 278 (1873); Johnson v. Johnson, 10 Ind. 387
(1858); Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Noll, 115 Ind. App. 289, 58 N.E.2d 947 (1945);
Trackwell v. Irvin, 66 Ind. App. 5, 115 N.E. 807 (1917).
57. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
58. The term restrictive covenant in gross denotes a covenant executed in favor of
a covenantee owning no land which would be benefited by the enforcement of the
covenant. If, of course, the state owned benefited land in the area of the restricted
zones, the covenants would readily be enforceable by it.
59. London County Council v. Allen, 3 K.B. 642 (1914). The decision in this
case was overturned by the 1936 Housing Act in connection with the operation of that
act. 25 Geo. 5 & I Edw. 8, c. 51, § 148.
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for the benefit of which the covenant was imposed, so the covenant was
in gross. The owner subsequently sold the plot to the defendant, who
had notice of the restrictive covenant. The defendant erected a structure
on the plot in violation of the covenant, and the plaintiffs sued to enforce
the restriction. The court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
equitable relief since they owned no land in the area which would be
benefited by the enforcement of the covenant.6" From a reading of the
opinion it appears that had the plaintiffs obtained land however insignifi-
cant, in the neighborhood, they could have restrained the defendant."'
One authority62 has pointed out that the court's refusal in London
County Council v. Allen to enforce the restrictive covenant in gross was
logical since the court viewed the equitable covenant as analogous to a
legal easement in gross, which had never been enforceable in the English
courts of law against subsequent purchasers of the servient estate. How-
ever logical its decision, the court should be criticized because of its tacit
admission that equity's concept of property interests and their enforce-
ability must be confined to the categories and rules established by courts
of law.
The conclusion reached by the English court in the London County
Council case appears to have influenced the majority of American courts,
including Indiana's, to deny enforcement of restrictive covenants in
gross.6" The result is illogical since most American courts have recognized,
60. The court overlooked, as a basis for a contrary decision, the police power of
the Council, Note, 13 Mica. L. REv. 150-51 (1914), and the public user of the street as
a dominant tenement. Note, 28 HArv. L. REv. 201-02 (1914).
61. It seems that a state holding property in proximity to a restricted tract should
take care that the property held is not too small. See Kent v. Kock, 166 Cal. App. 2d
579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958), where the court refused to enforce a restrictive covenant
under a uniform building scheme because the parcel retained by the plaintiff subdivider
was so small that it ". . . would in nowise be benefited by the enforcement of the
restrictions." Cf. Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183
N.E.2d 118 (1962), where plaintiff executed a restrictive covenant in favor of the
defendant city and, at the same time, gave the city an option to purchase thirty and
one-half acres in the tract owned by plaintiff so the city would possess a dominant
tenement if it ever became necessary for it to sue to enforce the covenant.
62. Reno, supra note 49, at 960.
63. Los Angeles Univ. v. Swarth, 107 F. 798 (9th Cir. 1901); Chandler v.
Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 338 P.2d 522 (Ct App. 1959); Forman v. Safe Deposit
Trust Co., 114 Md. 574, 80 Atl. 298 (1911) ; Kotesky v. Davis, 355 Mich. 536, 94 N.W.2d
796 (1959) ; Genung v. Harvey, 79 N.J. Eq. 57, 80 Atl. 955 (1911). The judicial opinions
dealing with this problem are often confusing; and as a result, noted authors of law
review articles have, in a few instances, incorrectly cited cases as holding that restric-
tive covenants in gross are unenforceable. E.g., St. Stephens Church v. Church of
Transfiguration, 130 App. Div. 166, 114 N.Y. Supp. 623 (1909), aff'd 201 N.Y. 1, 94
N.E. 191 (1911), cited by Reno, supra note 49, at 1088. In this case the court, contrary
to Reno's view, evaded the crucial issue of whether the restrictive covenant in gross was
enforceable. Instead, the court refused to permit enforcement of the covenant, ostensi-
bly on the ground that it was not supported by sufficient consideration, in spite of the
fact that the conveyance of the property, in itself, fulfilled the consideration requirement.
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as the English courts have not, the validity of easements in gross against
subsequent owners of the burdened estate. 4
It appears that only one jurisdiction, Illinois, has decided that restric-
tive covenants in gross are enforceable." In Van Sant v. Rose,6" the
plaintiffs conveyed land by a deed in which the grantee covenanted not to
build any structure within thirty feet of the front or side street line of the
land being conveyed and not to build any tenement building on the land.
The court held that although the covenantees owned no other property in
the vicinity they were entitled to enjoin violations of the covenants. The
court pointed out that,"7 while a bill to enjoin a breach of restrictive
covenants could not be maintained by one having no interest in their
enforcement, the grantors had reserved an interest by conveying subject
to the covenants. Thus, in effect, the court concluded that the restrictive
covenant whose enforceability was the subject of judicial inquiry was the
very interest which permitted the plaintiffs to successfully maintain their
action. 8 This circularity of reasoning evidences the unwarranted reluct-
ance of the court to grapple with the problem of the enforceability of
restrictive covenants in gross on its merits.
Other criticisms have been levied against the Van Sant case,"9 but
The court in American Cannel Coal Co. v. Indiana Cotton Mills, 78 Ind. App. 115,
134 N.E. 891 (1921), stated the Indiana position:
So long as the grantor in the deed containing the covenant, or anyone claiming
under it, owned any of the original abutting or contiguous land such owner
could enforce the covenant, but when such grantor or one claiming under it
ceases to hold such contiguous land, the covenant becomes personal and equity
will not enjoin a violation thereof in favor of the assignee of the covenantee or
against the assignee of the covenantor.
64. Reno, mpra note 49, at 1088-89.
65. Two writers have contended that restrictive covenants in gross are enforceable
in New York, citing Borrough Bill Posting Co. v. Levy, 144 App. Div. 784, 129 N.Y.
Supp. 740 (1911). Newman, A Legal Approach to Equitable Servitudes, 42 MIcH. L.
REv. 293, 301 (1943); Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a
Contract, 18 COLUm. L. Rnv. 291, 313 (1918). This is incorrect, however, for the case
involved the right to erect signboards on the land of another, a right which has tradi-
tionally 'been classified as an easement in gross, and the court in the Borrough case
specifically characterized the disputed interest as an easement in gross. Borrough Bill
Posting Co. v. Levy, supra at 787, 129 N.Y. Supp. at 742. Cf. Baseball Pub. Co. v.
Burton, 302 Mass. 54, 18 N.E.2d 362 (1938) (right to display sign on side of another's
building held to be an easement in gross); Joachim v. Belfers, 108 N.J. Eq. 622, 156
AtI. 121 (1931) (right to erect telephone poles on another's land held to be an easement
in gross).
66. Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913) ; Cf. Pratte v. Balatosas,
99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955).
67. Van Sant v. Rose, supra note 66, at 196.
68. Despite the court's circularity of reasoning and the fact that the parties were
the original covenantors and covenantees, Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194
(1913), unequivocally establishes that the law of Illinois is not so strictly defined as to
require that one seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant must show some bene-
ficial interest in the land affected by the covenant or in some adjoining tract.
69. Note, 27 HARV. L. Rxv. 493 (1914); Note, 11 ILL. L. REv. 283 (1916); Note, 9
ILL. L. REv. 58 (1914).
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authorities on real property law have supported the decision by pointing
out that in principle there is no justifiable reason why restrictive covenants
in gross should not be enforceable.7" To the extent that these authorities
have advocated allowing individual citizens to enforce restrictive covenants
in gross and thus perhaps to burden their covenantor inequitably, they
have advocated an argument which, if accepted by the courts, would
seriously restrict the alienability of land. However, insofar as they would
permit public agencies acting in the public interest to enforce such
covenants they have proposed a sound rule.7 '
Dicta in two comparatively recent and well reasoned decisions
evidence the judiciary's" tendency to move in this direction. In Vacca v.
Stika,"2 the defendant city conveyed a large tract of land under a recorded
deed to a construction corporation which covenanted for itself, its heirs,
and its assigns that no trade or business would be conducted on the
property conveyed. Plaintiff later purchased the land and sought to obtain
a license from the city clerk in order to operate a used car business on the
land. Though the property at that time was zoned for business, the clerk,
because of the restrictive covenant, refused to issue the license. Plaintiff
sued for mandamus. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court in an
unanimous decision reversed the lower court and held that mandamus
could issue only if the plaintiff had a clear right to the license and that
in view of the restrictive covenants which appeared to be enforceable by
the city the plaintiff did not have such a right."
In Hall v. Risley,74 in consideration of the city's relaxing building
ordinances to permit alteration of a building for use during the war, the
70. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 33, at 182-83; Jones, Equitable Restrictions on the
Use of Real Property and Their Relation to Covenants Running with the Land, Ciii-
KENT L. REv. 33 (1934) ; Newman, supra note 65; Stone, supra note 65; Note, 37 YALE
L.J. 125 (1927). Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913), and Stone's views
are cited with approval in Huber v. Gugliemi, 29 Ohio App. 290, 163 N.E. 571 (1928).
71. The argument that the doctrine of the unenforceability of restrictive covenants
in gross should not be applied to governmental bodies can also be found 'by analogy to
property owners' association cases. See Merrionettee Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n
v. Heda, 11 Ill. App. 2d 186, 136 N.E.2d 556 (1956) ; Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n
v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938). In Neponsit,
the court of appeals held that the plaintiff association could enforce the covenants even
though it had not succeeded to the ownership of any property in the tract and did not
own any other property to which a right of enjoyment was appurtenant. Cf. United
States v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 244 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1957), holding that a government
petition to take a clearance easement on land at the end of an airport runway was
sufficient even though the government neither owned nor controlled any neighboring
tract which would benefit from the easement.
72. 21 N.J. 471, 122 A.2d 619 (1956).
73. From a reading of the court's opinion, it appears defendant made no showing
that it owned land near the restricted tract which would be benefited by enforcement of
the covenant or that lots it owned in the tract were subject to the covenant so that it
could secure enforcement of such covenant by invoking a uniform building scheme theory.
74. 188 Ore. 69, 213 P.2d 818 (1950).
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covenantor agreed to restore the building to its previous legal use at the
end of the war. The Supreme Court of Oregon held the covenant was not
enforceable against a bona fide purchaser but added as a dictum that
the covenant would have been enforceable against the covenantor and his
successors who took with notice even though the city owned no benefited
land in the neighborhood.
However, in spite of the dicta in the two preceding cases and the
decision in Vanz Sant v. Rose, most courts still continue to deny enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants in gross. This rigid judicial attitude will
lead to unfortunate results in situations where a state as a covenantee is
seeking to preserve regions of scenic beauty through the device of these
covenants. But whether the courts can be persuaded to drop the rigid and
ancient doctrine that restrictive covenants in gross are unenforceable is a
difficult question to answer because of property law's traditional hostility
to innovation, even when the innovation is predicated upon sound policy
considerations. In view of this, for a state to contend that its interests
are enforceable as restrictive covenants in gross would be to rest the
future of a potentially far-reaching program on the slenderest of reeds.
III. SOME SUGGESTIONS
Analysis of the enforceability of the interests which would be held
by a state under a "do-it-yourself zoning" program makes it exceedingly
clear that if such a program is to be free from vexing legal questions
which might jeopardize its effectiveness, the legislature must draft legis-
lation which specifically deals with these questions and which specifically
spells out, as the New York statute does not, the type of interests held by
the state and the enforceability of those interests.
First, an appropriate statute should assert, in unequivocal language,
as the New York statute does not, that the interests which the state
acquires will be statutory interests. 5 This is of crucial importance since
such an assertion is the only method by which the state can remove the
interests acquired under the proposal, if enacted, from the jungle of
common-law property interests which, as pointed out earlier, presently
threatens to topple the Lake George Park scheme.
75. In New York, the commission might argue that it holds statutory interests.
Whether the courts would accept the argument that the legislature would not have
enacted the statute creating the Lake George Park Commission unless it intended to
give the commission power to acquire enforceable property interests even though such
interests did not satisfy the traditional common law requirements necessary for the
enforcement of covenants running with the land, easements, or restrictive covenants is a
question of some uncertainty. The court might reason that if the legislature intended to
abrogate the common-law objections to the interests held -by the commission, it should
have done so in no uncertain terms since it is presumed to have known the reluctance of
the judiciary to recognize new types of property interests created by implication.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
In the alternative, if the state, for one reason or another, wants to
work within the framework of the common-law property concepts, it
should enact legislation permitting it to enforce restrictive covenants
in gross or, for that matter, any other type of property interest. Wis-
consin, which has not passed on the question of the enforceability of re-
strictive covenants in gross, has enacted such a statute. It provides :"0
Any restriction placed on platted land by covenant, grant of
easement or in any other matter . . . which names a public
body as grantee, promisee or beneficiary, shall vest in such public
body the right to enforce the restrictions at law or in equity
against anyone who has or acquires an interest in the land subject
to the restrictions. 7
Although the Wisconsin statute raises new problems,"8 the adoption
of a similar law by a state would enable it to effectively enforce previously
unenforceable property interests (that is, restrictive covenants in gross)
executed in furtherance of a "do-it-yourself zoning" scheme.
Second, the statute must explicitly describe, as the New York statute
does not, those rights the landowner forfeits and those he retains under
the agreement executed between himself and the state. If the interests
created under the proposed statute are of an indefinite nature which
would in turn hinder their enforcement the courts would surely hesitate
to recognize their validity.7"
Third, although the statute might raise constitutional issues,8" it
should provide, as the New York statute does not, for a reduction of
property taxes on the burdened tract commensurate with the amount of
development potential which has been forfeited by the landowner under
his agreement with the state.8 ' The reasons why this taxation provision
should be included in the statute are twofold. First, although it appears
76. Wis. STAT. § 236.293 (1957).
77. The statute also states, "Such restriction may be released or waived in writing
by the public body having the right of enforcement." Wis. STAT. § 236.293 (1957).
This provision is similar to § 843(5) found in the New York statute.
78. E.g., can the law relate back to the original covenantor or subsequent purchaser
so as to validate the theretofore unenforceable interests acquired by the public body?
See also the problems raised by N.Y. CONSERVATION LAw §§ 840-49 discussed sapra at
note 31.
79. Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Conm'rs of Cleveland Metropolitan Park
Dist., 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922).
80. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
81. It has been pointed out, Eveleth supra note 17, at 580, that there is a possibility
the Federal Internal Revenue Code permits a charitable deduction for the grant of de-
velopment rights to the state for the fair market value of the right with an adjustment
in the basis of the property. Rev. Rul. 64-205, INT. Rv. BULL. 1964-30, 6 § 170(c) (1).
However, if the restrictions are enforceable inter se, there is a corresponding benefit to
the landowner which might negate donative intent.
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self-evident that a property tax would not be levied upon development
values which have been surrendered to the state,8" nevertheless subdividers
who dedicate permanent easements to the public have sometimes been
assessed for the full value of the land. 3 Second, a provision limiting
property taxes when development potential is restricted is a powerful
inducement for property owners to surrender freely their development
rights."
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In view of the increasing tempo of urbanization in Indiana, it seems
that land planners should seriously consider the possibilities of "do-it-
yourself-zoning" as an inexpensive method of preserving areas of scenic
beauty. Landowners in areas where urban development is imminent will
not, in most instances, donate development rights to the public even though
they could secure property tax relief by so doing. It would seem though,
that in scenic areas landowners having a compelling interest in main-
taining the land in its present condition might be ready participants in a
"do-it-yourself-zoning" program. In spite of the possibility that only
a limited number of landowners might participate in such a program, the
availability of "do-it-yourself-zoning" could nevertheless play a sig-
nificant role in preserving areas of scenic beauty, for no other comparable
land use program would offer the opportunity, under certain circum-
stances, to reap such large benefits at such a minimal cost.
ORGANIZING THE TOWNHOUSE IN INDIANA*
In one century, the proportion of the American population living in
82. N.Y. MuNic. LAW § 247(3).
83. Cf., e.g., Maisen v. Naxey, 233 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
84. A statute similar to the one under discussion which would only authorize
voluntary transfers of development interests would be of limited value to a state at-
tempting comprehensive preservation of scenic areas since the cooperation of many
landowners is often unattainable. It has been suggested, Note, 75 HARV. L. :RLv. supra
note 7; Note, 12 STAN. L. REv. 638 (1960), that the state employ its power of eminent
domain to permit condemnation of interests restricting land to scenic uses. This pro-
posal raises the difficult question of whether the exercise of the power of eminent domain
to secure limited rights in realty is constitutional when motivated by aesthetic considera-
tions. A decision by the Supreme Court a decade ago in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954), appears to indicate that the power of eminent domain can be exercised for
aesthetic purposes under the fifth amendment. For discussions of the implications of
this case, see Lashly, The Case of Berman, v. Parker: Public Housing and Urban Re-
development, 41 A.B.A.J. 501 (1955) ; Note, 23 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 730 (1955).
* The basic reference for anyone undertaking a study of townhouses is UnANr
LAND INSTITUTE, THE HomEs AssocIATiON HANDBOOK (Technical Bulletin 50, 1964).
This work surveys all aspects of townhouse homes associations and answers all general
